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I. INTRODUCTION
Establishing societies that respect the rule of law is an almost
universally shared, but elusive, aspiration. Such a society has a political,
judicial, and cultural infrastructure that supports a stable economic
structure and protects personal freedoms. Five common principles support
this infrastructure: 1) Acknowledgment of private property; 2) Domestic
(national) protection of human rights; 3) Maintenance of a system of
justice that effectively protects personal and individual rights; 4)
Establishment of a governance system that is transparent, accountable, and
legitimate; and 5) The overall presentation of a system that is accepted by
the global community as legitimate and reliable. These principles represent
a point of departure in examining the status of the rule of law in the
Americas.
A state may establish these principles in varied ways but there are
common paths. First, establishing self-government based on fair elections
that select representatives who actually govern. Second, adoption of a
binding governmental obligation or constitution, which protects and
establishes rights. As a structure, the constitutional democracy protects the
minority, supports the majority's political views, and creates a stable
tension that allows the evolution of policies over time.
In support of this evolution, a written constitution should protect the
private sphere from majoritarianism, respect and enforce rights, solve
problems of collective self action, ensure that duly elected representatives
follow the will of the people, and be perceived as a legitimate functional
instrument of governance. But written constitutions widely vary in their
actual impact. While some constitutions are functional, controlling, and the
basis for private and public action, some are aspirational and observed in
the breach. While the United States has a relatively short constitution with
a strong interpretive and authoritative role for the judiciary, some South
American constitutions are lengthy and establish lofty principles with
uncertain procedures and mechanisms for enforcement.
Our challenge is to establish the underpinning for a "constitutional
democracy" that supports the above-mentioned five principles. In sum, a
written basis for private property, human rights, an independent justice
system, and legitimate democratic governance is a prerequisite but not a
guarantee. The social structure and civil society must support the written
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commitment. The commentary below describes how each of the five
principles may be achieved in the Americas.
To a great degree, ajust society depends upon judicial institutions, and
for this reason, both constitutional revision and reform of the judiciary in
particular have been key factors in the evolution towards the rule of law.
This is especially true both for Americans and for Floridians. We in Florida
have undergone many significant reforms ofjudicial institutions since the
adoption of our present state constitution in 1968, as our state struggled to
reform legal institutions and processes to serve a fast-growing and
increasingly diverse population.'
Rule of law development is a process that many have fostered, either
as members ofjudicial or governmental bodies. Likewise, those who work
with funding organizations such as the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) or the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
have provided both resources and technical assistance to rule of law and
judicial reform programs throughout the Americas. Similarly, we are
delighted to have with us the director of the OAS-established Justice
Center of the Americas, an institution that has already become a
clearinghouse of information and technical assistance in this field. Many
participants come with years of legal, academic, or professional
experience, often in several countries, and have made contributions both
in their research and teaching capacities. The expansion of civil society has
also brought concerned citizens and nongovernmental organizations into
the process as advocates and exponents of reform.
We can learn from the past: the various initiatives throughout the
Americas provide examples for our study. While at the White House,
Buddy MacKay, who currently teaches as an adjunct Professor at the Levin
College of Law, surveyed every country in the Americas detailing existing
programs relating to the rule of law. The vast array of experiments,
initiatives, studies, and programs will help serve as a foundation for future
options.
The statement of principles is made with the understanding that
common policies may be applied across different cultures. We are aware
enough to understand that particular governmental and judicial systems
that work in one culture may not work in another. However, some
1. Important Florida reforms include: 1) court-ordered mediation to speed the resolution of
citizen disputes; 2) restricted jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court, making intermediate
appellate courts the normal final courts of review, with the Florida Supreme Court limited to cases
of great importance and conflicts among appeals courts; 3) reforms allowing local referenda to
introduce merit selection and retention of trial judges; and 4) changes to court funding to provide
a more equitable burden-sharing between local governments and the state.
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agreement on principles and goals will allow the pursuit of various avenues
to reach those goals.
II. RECOGNITION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ABILITY TO
TRANSFER THESE RIGHTS
This characteristic requires not only the availability of secure legal
status for property, but also mechanisms to allow for its lawful sale and
exchange.2 Commentators such as Hernando de Soto and Richard Posner
have written about the need for security of title to property as a
fundamental basis for economic development.' The recognition of these
property rights by judicial organs is an accompanying necessity, if there is
to be sustainable development.
In Eastern Europe the fall of the Iron Curtain allowed a return of
transferable private property and created a challenge in establishing and
promoting an effective system that created individual rights where few had
existed. Potential transitions in places such as Cuba to private property
principles would use those lessons.4
2. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 17, GA Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc.
A/810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration] (providing for protection of individual
property rights). Both the U.S. and Florida Constitutions provide protection for property rights,
especially from confiscation by the state or its agencies. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 2 (recognizing the right of natural persons "to acquire, possess and protect property").
3. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH 160 (1986); Hemando de Soto, Protection
of Property Rights and Civil Society, in JUSTICE DELAYED: JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA
73-82 (Edmundo Jarquin & Fernando Carrillo eds., 1998) (discussing property title reforms in
Peru); Richard A. Posner, Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development, 13 WORLD
BANK RES. OBSERVER 2-3 (1998).
4. See Jon Mills & Kern Alexander, Resolving Property Claims in Post Socialist Cuba, 27
GEO. J.L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 137 (1995). In the United States, title problems often exist in so-
called brownfields and other abandoned properties within formerly industrialized urban
neighborhoods. See COMMUNITY LEGAL RESOURCE, CLEARING CLOUDED TITLE FOR THE
REDEVELOPMENT OF URBAN LAND: A GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 2 (2003). Because
of outstanding liens on property or confusion as to who owns the property in question, it remains
unused and blighted. See id. Legal tools, such as eminent domain, as well as creative financing, are
necessary to return this land to productive use and rehabilitate these neighborhoods. See J. Terrence
Farris, The Barriers to Using Urban Infill Development to Achieve Smart Growth, 12 HOUSING
POL'Y DEBATE 1, 14 (2001), available at http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hpd/pdf/
hpd_1201 _farris.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
AND ACTUAL RESPECT FOR THESE RIGHTS
In addition to property rights,5 the essential bundle of rights includes
freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and equal protection of all citizens
under the law.6 The existence of fundamental rights under a constitution,
or a basic contract between the state and the citizenry, is a prerequisite, but
so is the actual protection of guaranteed rights. Where enumerated rights
are not enforced, or are selectively enforced, or are so written as to be
literally unenforceable, this undermines faith in the applicability of the
constitution.
This is not to say that a constitution should not contain aspirational
language. Indeed, some evidence exists that the highlighting of
fundamental rights in the constitution in itself encourages government
organs to pay more attention to those rights.7 However, care should be
taken in constitutional drafting or revision processes to couple these
aspirations with attainable benchmarks that will allow reviewing courts to
measure the state's success or failure in upholding constitutional
guarantees.
The infrastructure and culture of ajustice system that supports human
rights is, of course, central to the meaningful existence of this second
principle.8 The system itself is discussed below in principle number three.
Protection of individual human rights must be designed to achieve the
following:
" protection of minority interests from abuse by the majority or by
government;
" equal protection of individuals preventing discrimination based on
identity, including ethnicity, race, language, religion, sex, social or
political roots, to name a few;
5. See Berta Esperanza Hernndez-Truyol, Property, Wealth, Inequality and Human Rights:
A Formulafor Reform, 34 IND. L. REV. 1213 (2001).
6. See, e.g., Universal Declaration, supra note 2, passim; American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of
American States (1948); American Convention on Human Rights, art. 1, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123 (1978) (obligation of all American countries to protect enumerated rights).
7. See, e.g., Linda Camp Keith, Writing Constitutions that Protect Against Human Rights
Abuse - How Important are Provisions for Judicial Independence and Judicial Review?, Paper
prepared for the 1999 Conference on the Scientific Study of Judicial Politics, Texas A&M
University (Oct. 21-23, 1999) (on file with the author).
8. See generally BERTA ESPERANZAHERNANDEZ-TRUYOL, MORALIMPERIALISM, ACRmTCAL
ANTHOLOGY: HUMAN RIGHTS, GLOBALIZATION AND CuLTURE 353-69 (2002).
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" freedom to participate in government, both in selection of leadership,
as with the right to vote, and in policymaking, as well as by running for
election;
" freedom of speech and association;
" right to individual identity and privacy from government intervention;
and
" access to the justice system.
"Bill of rights" types of principles should be expressly stated. The
recognition of those rights is a prerequisite to developing legitimacy and
a culture that protects the individual. Among the goals of articulating such
principles are: to define the limits of democratic institutions and the
operations of government, to state in enforceable terms broadly held
values, and to take the debate of some issues off the agenda. The next step
is to provide the context, mechanism, and system to enforce those rights.
IV. ACCESS TO A RELIABLE JUSTICE SYSTEM
A system ofjustice must, at the threshold, support the principles cited
above: private property rights and individual rights. In other words, to
establish a state that abides by the rule of law, the standards for individual
protections must not only exist but also have a reliable, accessible, and
timely enforcement of those rights. I include in ajustice system alternative
means of dispute resolution.
A. Availability of Justice
This characteristic focuses on the practical ability of citizens to make
use of dispute resolution mechanisms. It includes the requirement that the
system be accessible, and the subsidiary requirement that it allow for
movement of cases within the systems.9 As the saying goes, "Justice
9. See, e.g., Universal Declaration, supra note 2, art. 8 (providing "[elveryone has the right
to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights
granted him by the constitution or by law"); see also id. arts. 10 & II (providing for speedy access
to courts for those accused of crimes). By way of comparison, the Florida Constitution provides
that, "The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be
administered without sale, denial or delay." FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 21. In the Quebec City Summit
Action Plan, OAS leaders pledged to help foster access to justice in the Americas, stating that the
American states would "[s]upport public and private initiatives and programs to educate people
about their rights relating to access to justice, and promote measures that ensure prompt, equal, and
universal access to justice." TI-RD SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS, PLAN OF ACTION (2001) [hereinafter
THIRD SuMMI, available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ministerials/Quebec/plane.asp (last visited
Oct. 27, 2003).
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delayed is justice denied."'" Timeliness is a widespread problem given the
backlogs in many court systems; regional surveys indicate that citizens
accused of crimes can wait up to five years for trial, and between half and
three-quarters of those held in prisons in many countries have not yet been
formally sentenced."
The use of the term dispute resolution is an attempt to paint with the
broadest brush, and of course includes both the traditional court systems
as well as the justices of the peace used both in many Latin American
countries and in many American states.'" Today, any examination of
dispute resolution would also look to the incorporation of alternative
dispute models, and their increasing recognition as a useful tool to both
increase legal efficiency and citizen satisfaction by allowing for quicker
resolution of citizen conflicts. 3 Throughout the Americas, nations have
implemented a variety of reforms and programs, some successful, some
less successful. Each can teach useful lessons.
1. Traditional Court System
The availability of timely access to courts to an average citizen may
also be a factor contributing to popular confidence in the judiciary, and
thus indicative of the success of judicial reforms. Where resolution of
disputes in courts is delayed, citizen dissatisfaction with the judiciary is
likely to be significant.
The importance of a sound, technologically advanced infrastructure
within the court system is undisputed. Lack of improvements in this area
can significantly hamper the success of other forms of reforms within the
10. Gohman v. City of St. Bernard, 111 Ohio St. 726, 737 (1924).
11. See LAURIE COLE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE
AMERICAS (FOCAL, Summit of the Americas Follow-Up Series, No. 1, 2002), at 17, available at
http://www.focal.ca/images/pdf/summitjustice.pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2003). Surveys in
Venezuela and Argentina show that citizens accused of crimes wait an average of 4.5 years before
trial. Id. Similarly, the Andean Commission of Jurists reports that, for the Andean nations of
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, 43-72% of people in prison have not yet
been sentenced. Id.
12. See MARIA DAKOLIAS, THE JUDICIAL SECTOR IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN:
ELEMENTS OF REFORM 39-40 (World Bank Technical Paper No. 319, 1996) (discussing the role of
both lay and legally trained justices of the peace). Florida eliminated the jifstice of the peace
position in its judicial reform of 1972, but the office continues in other states.
13. See id. at 37-41 (examining the incorporation of ADR into national practice, including
both voluntary court-annexed mediation or ADR system and as a private, contract-based system of
dispute resolution).
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judiciary. 4 Filing fees which are excessive can also be a barrier to access
for poor citizens.' 5
Another barrier is geographical distance. Not all political subdivisions
in a country (provinces, etc.) have their own local courts. In some
instances, aggrieved parties have to travel tens or hundreds of miles to get
to the nearest court. This discourages resort to the judicial system,
especially for citizens of rural communities.16
In some countries, case backlogs exist at all levels of the judiciary. In
one notable example, the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court in 1997 faced
an enormous backlog of some 30,000 cases." This was the unexpected
result of the expansion of the Court's jurisdiction under the 1988
Constitution to include disputes over social, political, and economic rights,
all of which were expressly regulated in the Constitution." Most notably,
the Supreme Court under the 1988 Brazilian Constitution has no ability to
deny the writ of certiorari, even in trivial cases. Before long, the severity
of the problem became apparent and the government undertook to remedy
it by introducing the Superior Court of Justice, which alongside the
Supreme Court served as a court of last appeal. The Superior Court took
over some of the jurisdictional prerogatives of the Supreme Court, thus
somewhat reducing the latter's backlog. 9 Another remedy would be the
14. See WILLIAM C. PRILLAMAN, THE JUDICIARY AND DEMOCRATIC DECAY IN LATIN
AMERICA: DECLINING CONFIDENCE IN THE RULE OF LAW 90 (2000) (discussing lack of centralized,
computerized filing system in Brazil, which prompted simultaneous filing of cases in multiple
courts to improve chances for resolution in at least one court). Argentina noticed early the
importance of improvements in this area, and sought to modernize court operations through a
nationwide system of records computerization, intended to facilitate case tracking and management.
Id. at 120.
15. Id. at 91-92 (showing in Brazil, the access to court for an average citizen was significantly
improved through provisions requiring that a party pay only its own court costs and fees).
16. Edgardo Buscaglia, Obstacles in Judicial Reform in Latin America, in JUSTICE DELAYED:
JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA 15,24-25 (Edmundo Jarquin & Fernando Carrillo eds., 1998).
For example, peasants from the most remote rural regions in Peru must travel an average 53.1
kilometers (about 35 miles) to reach the nearest court. Id. at 25.
17. PRILLAMAN, supra note 14, at 91-92.
18. See BRAZILIAN C.F. art. 102 (describing the broad jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme
Court).
19. See PRILLAMAN, supra note 14, at 82. In Florida, similar case backlogs brought about a
constitutional change in 1980, which was intended to restrict the jurisdiction of the Florida
Supreme Court and left district courts of appeal as the normal final appellate courts. See Gerald
Kogan & Robert Craig Waters, The Operation and Jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court, 18
NOVA L. REV. 1151, 1225-37 (1994).
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appointment of newjudges, and the establishment of new courts to lighten
the load on existing institutions.2"
2. Implementing and Developing Alternative Dispute Resolution
International institutions have played an important role in introducing
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms in Latin America.
Significant contributions in this area came from the World Bank, the IDB,
the U.N. Development Programme, and the USAID.2 1
In Florida, court-annexed mediation has been made mandatory for most
civil cases, and has expanded successfully into the areas of family practice.
Mediation in Florida is directed by the Office of the Courts Administrator,
under the supervision of the Florida Supreme Court. Over the past twenty-
five years it has gained increasing acceptance and support among judges,
lawyers, and the general public.
B. Reliability of Justice
The reliability of any dispute resolution forum is, of course, central to
its ultimate utility and legitimacy. In other words, the system must function
and be seen to function by citizens. Inherent in this reliability is the
20. In Brazil, in addition to the introduction of the Superior Court of Justice, which assisted
the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court as a court of last appeal, other reforms aimed at improving
timely resolution of disputes. One major step was the decentralization of the appeals process
through the adoption of a nationwide system of regional federal appeals courts, rather than a
centralized appeals court sitting in Brasilia. See PRILLAMAN, supra note 14, at 82. Similarly, in
Argentina, funds were secured to hire more than 200 new judges in order to address the problem
of backlogs. Id. at 120.
21. See generally Luis Salas, From Law and Development to Rule of Law: New and Old
Issues in Justice Reform in Latin America, in RULE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA: THE
INTERNATIONAL PROMOTION OF JUDICIAL REFORM 24-28 (Pilar Domingo & Rachel Sieder eds.,
2002). The lack of success of ADR reforms in some countries can be explained rather simply-
local bar associations in some countries refuse to refer cases to ADR for fear of losing attorneys'
fees, which are usually made contingent on the filing of formal pleas in court, or on the number of
court appearances. Id. at 28. ADR reforms implemented in Chile in the 1990s created a model for
other Latin American countries. Noteworthy was the attempt to expand the arbitration of
commercial disputes, which was widely applauded by foreign investors and local chambers of
commerce, although initially its practical effects were not very impressive: in 1997, only 27
commercial disputes were sent to arbitration. PRILLAMAN, supra note 14, at 159 n.74. Similar
results appeared in the field of worker-employer relations, where the newly instituted national labor
directorate successfully employed mediation to resolve out-of-court some 75% of 4,000 labor
disputes. See generally id. at 144-51; see also Michael Samway, Access to Justice: A Study ofLegal
Assistance Programs for the Poor in Santiago, Chile, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 347-69 (1996)
(discussing Chilean reforms in detail, and noting that the Chilean access to justice reforms,
including legal clinics for the poor, had succeeded in resolving some 100,000 cases out of court).
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independence which is so essential to the proper functioning of the judicial
branch. Many countries throughout the Americas have taken steps to
secure the tenure of the judiciary from political manipulation.
1. Selection Process
In many instances, the selection process for judicial nominees in
countries throughout the Americas results not only in a necessary
independence of the bench, but also tends to more extreme consequences,
such as lack of accountability.22
In the United States, the selection process for federal judges has
become increasingly politicized due both to the power and independence
of federal judges, and to the requirement that these important executive
appointments receive the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate. In Florida,
there is an attempt to de-politicize judicial appointments through the
establishment of special local judicial appointment commissions composed
of lawyers and non-lawyers, not all of whom are nominated by the
Governor.2 These commissions submit a list of three nominees to the
Governor for each judicial vacancy from which one may be appointed.
Currently, Florida has a mixed system of judicial appointments under
which appellate judges are appointed through the judicial nomination
process, while most trial courtjudges are elected in nonpartisan elections.24
As part of the 1998 Constitution revision, there is now also a possibility for
22. PRILLAMAN, supra note 14, at 34 n.47. The institution of strict tenure and seniority
systems for judges in some Latin American countries has resulted in nepotism. For example,
according to World Bank Reports, in Ecuador internal investigation within the judiciary revealed
450 cases of nepotism. Id. (citing WORLD BANK, ECUADOR: JUDICIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT 14
(1994)) Many judges and court personnel were selected for office irrespective of any professional
criteria, and they held offices even though there was no record of their professional performance.
Id. In Brazil, one report revealed that the head of a labor court employed 60 relatives, at an annual
cost of $2 million, even though none of them had any formal legal or technical training, and had
not taken the legally mandated entrance exams. Id. (citing Brazil Labor Court Head Accused of
Hiring Family, REUTERS NEWS DISPATCH (Nov. 10, 1995)).
23. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 11 (d) & § 20(c)(5) (showing judicial nominating commissions
consist of nine members, of whom three are attorneys appointed by the Florida Bar, three are non-
lawyer appointees of the Governor, and three are non-lawyers selected by the other six commission
members).
24. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10. Florida Supreme Court justices and appellate court judges
have been selected by merit selection since 1976. See generally Joseph W. Little, An Overview of
the Historical Development of the JudicialArticle of the Florida Constitution, 19 STETSON L. REV.
1, 35 (1989). Vacancies to trial courts are also filled by merit selection. See FLA. CONST. art. V,
§ 11.
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local referenda to opt for merit selection and retention of trial court
judges.25
2. Independence
Judicial independence encompasses the ability of ajudge to rule free of
either fear or favor in any given case.26 Independence of the judiciary is
vital in any system which aspires to the rule of law and the impartial
administration of justice. Two possible threats to judicial independence
include: (1) those challenging the integrity ofjudicial institutions, and (2)
those that affect individual judges in specific decisions.27
This first type of threat is frequent in many parts of the hemisphere
where court systems may be politicized and judicial decisions may be
subject to external pressures or control. In modem society, the dependence
on other branches of government is always a question of degree, and for a
healthy judiciary to exist there must be a certain balance between
independence and accountability.
A problem in Latin America has traditionally been an inability to strike
a balance between the judiciary's independence and its accountability. 8
Recent history provides some methods used to reduce judicial
independence: limiting tenure, packing courts, purging court personnel,
and creating special tribunals under the control of the executive branch.
a. Limiting Tenure
In Latin America, limiting tenure of judges is a consequence of the
traditionally strong position of the executive (president); typically, the
incoming president will have the authority to shape and staff his
25. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10(b). To date, voters have not opted for merit retention in any
trial court jurisdiction.
26. See ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon i, cmt. v (1990).
27. See PRILLAMAN, supra note 14, at 16. Commentators distinguish several types of
independence necessary to a successful judiciary. See DAKOLIAS, supra note 12, at 9-11. These
include functional independence, under which decisions are made subject only to the authority of
the laws; personal independence, under whichjudges individually enjoy adequate security in office;
collective independence, under which judges participate in judicial administration; and internal
independence, under which judges are not subject to informal interference by otherjudicial bodies,
such as the Supreme Court. Id. In Quebec City in 2001, OAS leaders pledged to improve the
independence of the hemisphere's judiciary, stating that they would "[e]ncourage measures to
strengthen the independence of thejudiciary, including transparent judicial selection, secure tenure
on the bench, [and] appropriate standards of conduct and systems of accountability." THIRD
SUMMIT, supra note 9.
28. PRILLAMAN, supra note 14, at 19.
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bureaucracy (often including court personnel and judges).29 In other cases,
judges may be subject to undue legislative interference, both in matters of
funding and in matters of supervision and control of judicial matters.3" In
certain countries, the constitution may recognize judicial independence in
some provisions, only to weaken it in others.3'
In Florida, trial judges must stand in nonpartisan elections every six
years. Supreme court judges and appeals court judges are subject to voter
approval in retention elections every six years.32
b. Court Packing
Both military and civilian governments have resorted to this measure
in order to create more pliable courts.3
29. Id.
30. For example, under Paraguay's 1954 Constitution, judges formally enjoy broad powers,
but the Constitution also permits the legislature to review all judicial appointments every five years.
Id. Such a sweeping provision may inhibit judges' independence. Likewise, under El Salvador's
1966 Constitution, the president was allowed to seek and secure removal of a judge by a simple
majority vote in the unicameral legislature. Id. at 19.
31. For example, under the Mexican Constitution of 1917, judges are nominally protected
from outside influences by a guarantee of life tenure and irreducibility of salaries. See MEXICAN
CONST. art. 94(1) (irreducibility of remuneration); id. art. 96 (a duly appointed Supreme Court
judge "shall continue in office permanently"); id. art. 94(2) (impeachment of Supreme Courtjudges
for "bad conduct"). In practice, however, these guarantees have proven meaningless, because
federal judges are often transferred from one region of the country to another (a practice expressly
authorized under Article 97(2) of the Mexican Constitution, and limited only by what is
"convenient for better public service"), and the government has the authority to unilaterally transfer
cases from one docket to another. Id. art. 97(2). Also, political realities in Mexico have contributed
to the decrease in judges' independence: judgeships are often viewed as a stepping stone to more
financially lucrative political careers, and so in many cases judges are reluctant to rule against the
dominant political party. See PRILLAMAN, supra note 14, at 31 n.22 (citing Leonel Pereznieto
Castro, La Reforma Judicial, EXA%4EN 13-19 (Jan. 1995)).
32. See FLA. CoNST. art. V, § 10. In the retention election, electors are simply asked, "Shall
Justice (or Judge) (name of *ustice or iudge) of the (name of the court) be retained in office?" Id.
Florida judges normally may serve until their 70th year. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 8.
33. Court packing is not a phenomenon known only to Latin America. Many Americans
remember Franklin Delano Roosevelt's plan to increase the number of U.S. Supreme Courtjustices,
after he found his New Deal programs frustrated in the courts. See, e.g., Barry Cushman, A Stream
of Legal Consciousness: The Current of Commerce Doctrine from Swift to Jones & Laughlin, 61
FoRDHAM L. REv. 105 (1992). Similarly, in Argentina during the 1990s, the executive attempted
to exert control over the Supreme Court by increasing the number of justices from five to nine,
justifying this as a means of increasing the court's efficiency. See PRJLLAMAN, supra note 14, at 19.
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c. Court Purging
Short terms and insecure positions can work to frustrate judicial
independence and make the judiciary much less willing to take unpopular
decisions or stand up to the executive.34
d. Judicial Corruption
This problem implicates many issues (legitimacy, efficiency), but has
probably the most significant effect on judicial independence. Corruption
is a threat to judicial independence because it creates a suspect relationship
between the litigant's court and the litigant, which results in final decisions
based on considerations other then proper application of legal principles.35
Thus, it undermines the rule of law and the confidence in both state and
judiciary. The dispute resolution system must, thus, guard its integrity. All
the more if it is independent, internal reviews and grievance structures
must be established to guarantee a level of accountability for the judicial
branch of government, as well as for the actions of personnel within the
dispute resolution system.36
On the other hand, as a more positive sign, changes to tenure status are
being implemented in many states to balance security of tenure with
accountability.3
7
34. PRILLAMAN, supra note 14, at 20 (noting that, a survey of Bolivian judges in 1991 and
1992 found that only 40% ofjudges held their office for more than 4 years, and only 10% for more
than 10 years).
35. Id. at 25.
36. In this regard, recent impeachments of judges in several countries in Latin America on
charges of corruption have not only enjoyed widespread support, but have also made imperative
a consequent strengthening of the institutions to prevent this from happening in the future. See
Felipe Siez Garcia, The Nature of Judicial Reform in Latin America and Some Strategic
Considerations, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1267, 1270 (discussing the effect of these impeachments
in Bolivia and Chile). Chile provided an object lesson in judicial accountability in 1993.
Allegations of past abuse of office prompted President Aylwin to seek the impeachment of three
justices of the Supreme Court. Id, Only one justice was eventually convicted by the Senate, but the
psychological effects of the impeachment process itself were profound: for the first time in 125
years a Chilean judge was removed from office because of unprofessional conduct. Id This was a
clear signal that the Pinochet regime was truly over and that impunity of the judiciary for past
abuses was at an end. Id. Thus, the general public was assured that even those who are meant to
enforce the "rule of law" are also subject to the rule's limitations. See PRILLAMAN, supra note 14,
at 143-45.
37. See, e.g., Jorge Correa Sutil, Judicial Reforms in Latin America: Good News for the
Underprivileged?, in THE (UN) RULE OF LAW AND THE UNDERPRIVILEGED IN LATIN AMERICA 260
n. 15 (Juan E. Mdndez et al. eds., 1999) (noting mixed results for reforms introduced in Costa Rica,
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C. Role of Ombudsmen and Other Investigators of the Judicial System
Citizens should have faith that some part of the system is designed so
as to protect individuals from abuse by government authority. The recent
addition of an ombudsman, or Defensor del Pueblo, in many nations as a
popular advocate and investigator into governmental abuses is an
important reform measure in bringing to light governmental misconduct. 8
Likewise, public defenders and even prosecutors have an important role in
defending basic rights. In Brazil, the autonomy guaranteed the Ministirio
Pziblico has offered this branch an increasing role in the supervision of acts
by executive agencies, and encouraged judicial review of alleged law
violations by government entities.
D. Legal and Continuing Education
To support access to justice, there must be a system for training and
educating lawyers and other components of the judicial system. A
legitimate culture that supports the cited principles of individual property
and individual rights must be sustained with continuous renewal through
legal education. The legal education system in the Americas has strengths,
but the potential for shared experience and cooperation is much larger. The
system of legal education should also encompass continuing legal
education for practitioners, judges, and prosecutors to maintain some level
of competence for those on the bench and in practice.
Another important aspect of education is directed toward the general
public, that is, a direct and specific effort to educate the public as to the
value of the rule of law and the legal system. Public support defines
legitimacy, and an intelligent effort to explain the benefits of the system to
the general populace is of fundamental importance to maintaining
legitimacy.
Honduras, Panama, Guatemala, Peru, Chile, Columbia, Paraguay, and Argentina); COLE, supra note
11, at 10-12 (providing a comparative discussion of tenure in supreme courts for fifteen countries
in the Americas).
38. See generally MARC UNGER, DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA 36-
37 (2000) (detailing the expanded use of ombudsmen in the 1990s and their use in investigating
allegations of misconduct in the judiciary).
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V. EXISTENCE OF A TRANSPARENT, ACCOUNTABLE AND LEGITIMATE
SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE
Property rights, personal rights, and a fair justice system can only
survive if the structure of governance surrounding them is designed to
accept and protect those principles. The overall governmental system must
be legitimized through real democratic participation. Of course, the system
includes authentic public participation through democratic processes.
Participation extends beyond voting to participation in policy
decision-making through public input. Voting procedures must facilitate
participation and foster honest outcomes. The State of Florida provides an
example of how inadequate voting procedures can damage an election
process even in an advanced democracy. 9
Participation is made possible by transparent systems that are accessible
to public view and susceptible to public comment. Open meetings and
records are a hallmark of democracies and provide a means of public
accountability.40 The access to information and transparency implies the
ability to act on that information. This type of participation necessarily
includes protection of speech, dissent, and public action. Such actions must
be protected under human rights provisions and protections.
Accountability in governance will include some internal checks on
government actions to assure that the state itself is adhering to the rule of
law it has established. What have been termed checks and balances in the
U.S. Constitution are a form of accountability. The separation of powers
among the legislative, judicial, and executive branches is a means of
legitimizing the overall government. Similar checks may be provided
through broad rights of standing to allow court challenges to government
action.4
The overall structure must be designed to support all of the previously
enumerated principles. Such a structure will support private property,
39. See, e.g., Jon L. Mills, Florida on Trial: Federalism in the 2000 Presidential Election,
13 STAN. L. & POY REV. 83 (2002) (discussing causes and effects of the 2000 Florida election
controversy).
40. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24 (guaranteeing a right to open records and meetings).
41. In Brazil and other Latin American states, the public civil action has become a potentially
powerful tool by citizens and nongovernmental organizations against government conduct which
contravenes the law. By giving broad standing for those attacking such violations, the law
encourages citizens to participate in and use the courts for enforcement of laws against the state.
See generally Paulo Roberto Pereira de Souza, Da Impossibilidade de Utilizavio da Denuncia(Zo
da Lide na Ao Civil Pdblica, 1998 REvISTA DE CIENCIAS JURiDICAS 43; JOSt LAZARO ALFRDO
GUIMARAES, As Ai OES COLETIVAS E AS LIMINARES CONTRA ATOS DO PODER PUBL1CO 43-60 (2d
ed. 1993).
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human rights, and a judicial system that upholds them. The government,
beyond the judicial system, should also reflect the above characteristics of
openness and accountability to allow it to achieve legitimacy, subject to the
culture and history of the state.
VI. GLOBAL LEGITIMACY
Global legitimacy facilitates economic and social participation in the
community. It seems logical that if a structure under the rule of law has
received legitimacy within its own country, the next step is acceptance of
that legitimacy beyond its borders. Again, I emphasize that legitimacy does
not, or should not, reflect or require conformity.42 There are multiple
approaches to achieve the previously cited principles.
In the era of globalization, no state or country is an island to itself. For
business to be conducted, third parties must have some modicum of faith
in the domestic system of a given country. A functioning and impartial
dispute resolution system is not in itself sufficient for development.
However, a nation's courts and other legally accepted dispute resolution
mechanisms will either encourage or hinder development.43
There has been a widespread legal cross-fertilization, with many
countries looking to other nations for model laws and practices. An
example of this is the widespread adoption of laws based on the U.S.
Commercial Code, or European equivalents. Likewise, the adoption by
many Latin American countries of oral proceedings over the past ten years
is an effort to integrate an important aspect of the North American
adversarial model into the inquisitorial model." This is not to say that
identical legal structures are required in every country. Legal structures and
practices need to reflect and respect the society and culture in which they
are to function, or they will not continue to function over time.
Driven in part by funders of judicial assistance programs, there have
been moves recently to develop indicators or checklists of judicial
performance. Linn Hammergren, who has long worked in the area of
judicial reform for both the World Bank and USAID, released a proposed
42. See generally Michael Gordon, Legal Cultures of Latin America and the United States:
Conflict or Merger, 59 FLA. L. REV. 115 (2003).
43. See Posner, supra note 3, at 3-4 (noting that it is often easier and more efficient to begin
with rule-based reforms of a procedural nature before beginning with the large-scale creation of new
administrative models).
44. See COLE, supra note 11, at 21-22 (noting that ten Latin American nations introduced oral
proceedings during the period from 1992-99).
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checklist that synthesizes and expands on prior indicators.45 Hammergren's
proposed indicators measure such major categories as institutional
integrity, independence, and transparency/accountability (each of which
includes specific criteria addressing 1) judicial selection; 2) tenure and
judicial careers; 3) internal administration of courts; 4) resources and
funding; 5) judicial processes and case management; and 6) the legal
profession).46 The use of such indicators allows for more than mere internal
monitoring; it also establishes performance standards by which each
country's dispute resolution system may be measured and compared with
others.
VII. CONCLUSION
Establishing and fostering lawful democratic societies in the Americas
is a widely held goal. All in the Americas will benefit when there are stable
and just societies in our neighborhood of the world.
45. See LINNHAMMERGREN, DIAGNOSINGJUDICIALPERFORMANCE: TOWARDATOOLTO HELP
GUIDE JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAMS 1-91 (1999).
46. Id.

